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Abstract
This note argues that the United States policy, as exhibited by the Launch Act, and the intent
of the Moon Treaty are not mutually exclusive. Part I of this Note examines the history of the
Moon Treaty. Part II examines the current United States policy regarding private enterprise in
outer space in light of the passage of the Launch Act. Part III then argues that private enterprise
may legally operate in space under the Moon Treaty and the United States policy of encouraging
private space development that would not be adversely affected if the United States signs the Moon
Treaty. This note concludes that the intent of the Launch Act and the intent of the Moon Treaty
are far from being contradictory, both promote the development of space resources and provide a
stable, orderly framework to accomplish that goal.
THE COMMERCIAL SPACE LAUNCH ACT: AMERICA'S
RESPONSE TO THE MOON TREATY?
INTRODUCTION
Under United Nations sponsorship in 1984, the Agree-
ment Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies (Moon Treaty) entered into force.1
This treaty provides the most comprehensive framework ever
designed for the development of space resources. The accessi-
bility of the moon, coupled with current technology, present
the moon's natural resources as the first logical target of devel-
2opment. One major obstacle preventing realization of the
Treaty's purpose is that the United States, the major actor in
space activities, has refused to sign the Treaty. Detractors of
the Moon Treaty within the United States argue that the
Treaty would bar the private sector from operating profit-ori-
ented enterprises in outer space.4 Moreover, the detractors
note that in the United States, the private sector already enjoys
the right to launch and operate space vehicles under the Com-
mercial Space Launch Act of 1984 (Launch Act).5 Thus, there
is an argument that current United States policy, as embodied
in the Launch Act, precludes the United States from signing
the Moon Treaty.
This Note argues that the United States policy, as exhib-
1. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celes-
tial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 5, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1434 [hereinafter Moon
Treaty].
2. Soil samples recovered from the landing sites of Apollo missions 14, 16, and
17 contained in amounts greater than 1 percent: oxygen, silicon, aluminum, calcium,
iron, and magnesium. Samples which contained amounts of 0.1 to 1 percent were:
chromium, manganese, sodium, potassium, sulfur, and phosphorous. There were
also trace amounts of hydrogen, helium, carbon, and nitrogen present in the soil.
The proposed mining operations upon the moon require no new technological
breakthroughs. Simple adaptation of conventional construction equipment such as
scrapers and front-end loaders could be used to collect the loose lunar topsoil. This
equipment could be operated by remote control. SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCI-
ENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE Ac-
TIVITIES OF STATES ON THE MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES (Comm. Print 1980)
281 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
3. The other major space operator, the Soviet Union, has also refused to sign
the Treaty.
4. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 465-67.
5. Commercial Space Launch Act, 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 2601-2623 (1982 & Supp.
III 1985) [hereinafter Launch Act].
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ited by the Launch Act, and the intent of the Moon Treaty are
not mutually exclusive. Part I of this Note examines the his-
tory of the Moon Treaty, particularly the controversy sur-
rounding the use of the "common heritage of mankind" provi-
sion and the plan for an international regime to regulate space
resources. Part II examines the current United States policy
regarding private enterprise in outer space in light of the pas-
sage of the Launch Act. Part III then argues that private enter-
prise may legally operate in space under the Moon Treaty and
the United States policy of encouraging private space develop-
ment would not be adversely affected if the United States signs
the Moon Treaty. This Note concludes that the intent of the
Launch Act and the intent of the Moon Treaty are far from
being contradictory, both promote the development of space
resources and provide a stable, orderly framework to accom-
plish that goal.
I. THE MOON TREATY
A. Pre-Moon Treaty Space Law
When the United States successfully landed a man on the
moon on July 20, 1969,6 two international agreements existed
concerning outer space, the United Nations Treaty on Princi-
ples Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies7 (Space Treaty) and the United Nations Agreement on
the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space8 (Rescue
Treaty). The Space Treaty, signed in 1967, is a general agree-
ment that outlined a plan for the peaceful exploration and de-
velopment of space. 9 This treaty provided the foundation
upon which all subsequent international space agreements
have been constructed. The Space Treaty also established the
6. TiME, July 25, 1969, at 10.
7. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967,
18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Space Treaty].
8. Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the
Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened for signature Apr. 22, 1968, 19
U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6599, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 [hereinafter Rescue Treaty].
9. See Space Treaty, supra note 7, preamble, 18 U.S.T. at 2411, T.I.A.S. No. 6347
at 2, 610 U.N.T.S. at 207.
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principle that international law, rather than the law of any sin-
gle nation, would govern man's activities in space.' °
The Rescue Treaty, signed in 1968, was intended "to de-
velop and give further concrete expression"" to those sections
of the Space Treaty dealing with the obligation to aid
spacefarers and to return them and their equipment to their
countries of origin.' 2 Spacefarers are considered representa-
tives of their respective governments under the Space Treaty
and as such must be treated by the international community as
any other national representative.' 3 In 1973 the United Na-
tions Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects' 4 (Liability Treaty) expanded upon
the Space Treaty's provisions concerning international tort lia-
bility.' 5 The Liability Treaty is a detailed document placing re-
sponsibility upon a nation for any space activities conducted
under its flag, whether of a governmental or private nature.' 6
Finally, in 1975 the United Nations Convention on Registra-
tion of Objects Launched into Outer Space 17 (Registration
Treaty) provided that all objects launched into space be regis-
tered with the Secretary-General of the United Nations." The
10. "States Parties to the Treaty shall carry on activities in the exploration of
outer space ... in accordance with international law." Id. art. III., 18 U.S.T. at 2413,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347 at 6, 610 U.N.T.S. at 208.
11. Rescue Treaty, supra note 8, preamble, 19 U.S.T. at 7572, T.I.A.S. No. 6599
at 2, 672 U.N.T.S. at 121.
12. Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. V, 18 U.S.T. at 2414, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 at 5,
610 U.S.T. at 208-09.
13. See id.
14. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762 [hereinafter Liability Treaty].
15. Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. VII, 18 U.S.T. at 2415, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 at
6, 610 U.N.T.S. at 209:
Each State Party to the Treaty that launches or procures the launching of an
object into outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, and
each State Party from whose territory or facility an object is launched, is
internationally liable for damage to another State Party to the Treaty or to
its natural or juridical persons by such object or its component parts on the
Earth, in air space or in outer space, including the moon and other celestial
bodies.
Id.
16. See generally Liability Treaty, supra note 14.
17. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, opened
for signature Jan. 14, 1975, 28 U.S.T. 695, T.I.A.S. No. 8480 [hereinafter Registration
Treaty].
18. Id. art. II, para. 1, 28 U.S.T. at 698, T.I.A.S. No. 8480 at 4.
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registration of space objects in a central place aids in the im-
plementation of the general provisions of the Space Treaty,1 9
the proper return of astronauts and equipment under the Res-
cue Treaty,20 and the determination of international liability
under the Liability Treaty. 2' Thus, space law prior to the
Moon Treaty consisted of the foundation Space Treaty and a
series of treaties expanding upon the specific provisions of the
Space Treaty.
B. History Of The Moon Treaty
The Space Treaty did include "the moon and other celes-
tial bodies ' 2 2 within its purview. However, the physical pres-
ence of man on the moon prompted the international commu-
nity to seek a more specific agreement on the use of lunar re-
sources to supplement the highly theoretical Space Treaty.
23
Oddly, Argentina, a developing nation without space ca-
pabilities, took the initiative within the United Nations on the
issue. Argentina submitted a draft treaty in 1970 known as the
Draft Agreement on the Activities in the Use of Natural Re-
sources of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.24 It was this
proposed agreement that first attempted to apply the so-called
''common heritage of mankind" principle to the development
of space resources. 5 In 1971, the Soviet Union submitted its
own draft26 of a moon treaty to the United Nations Committee
19. See generally Space Treaty, supra note 7. In order to carry out the proposed
international cooperative effort in space it would be necessary that a central record
be kept of all on-going space operations.
20. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
21. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
22. Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. I, 18 U.S.T. at 2412, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 at 3,
610 U.N.T.S. at 207. Celestial bodies include all planets, moons, and asteroids
within the Solar System, or the natural resources of any such body. Extraterrestrial
material reaching the earth by natural means are specifically excluded. Cheng, The
Moon Treaty: Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bod-
ies within the Solar System other than the Earth, December 18, 1979, 33 CURRENT LEGAL
PRoBs. 213, 218-19 (1980).
23. See supra notes 7-19 and accompanying text.
24. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/L.71 and Corr. 1 (1970).
25. Id.
26. U.N. Doc. A/8391 and Corr. 1 and annex. "In contrast to the Argentine
draft, the Soviet proposal (a) applied only to the moon but not to other celestial
bodies, and (b) did not deal with the problems of resources." Cheng, supra note 22,
at 215.
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on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.2 7 After seven years of
debate,28 the Moon Treaty was finally submitted to the General
Assembly29 and formally adopted by a unanimous vote on De-
cember 5, 1979.
The Moon Treaty embodies three basic concepts. First,
the Moon Treaty provides that the moon is not subject to any
territorial claim by any nation or private body. 0 Second, the
Moon Treaty seeks to further space exploration by providing
for free and open access to the moon by all nations. 31 Third,
the Moon Treaty provides for the establishment of an organi-
zational framework for the continuing development of space
resources.3 2 This latter concept has been the leading subject
of debate surrounding the Moon Treaty. Exactly who may de-
velop natural resources found in space, or how they may be
developed, is not clear in the document. As a result, each na-
tion has its own interpretation of what its rights and duties are
under the Treaty.33
27. The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space was
established on December 13, 1958. While originally composed of 24 members, the
number grew in proportion to the interest in space operations. There are two sub-
committees, the Legal Subcommittee and the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee.
Each Subcommittee prepares a report for the parent Committee. The Committee
then issues a report for the General Assembly's Special Political Committee which
then drafts a resolution for submission to the General Assembly. Hosenball, The
United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Past Accomplishments and Future
Challenges, 7J. SPACE L. 95, 95-96 (1979).
28. The Soviet Union was the major opponent of the developing nations during
negotiations of the Moon Treaty and was primarily responsible for the seven year
delay between the submission of the first draft treaty and the final document. SENATE
REPORT, supra note 2, at 333.
29. N.Y. Times, July 4, 1979, at A4, col. 1.
30. Moon Treaty, supra note 1, art. 11, para. 2, 18 I.L.M. at 1438.
31. Id. art. 6, para. 1, 18 I.L.M. at 1436. "There shall be freedom of scientific
investigation on the moon by all States Parties without discrimination of any kind, on
the basis of equality and in accordance with international law." Id. See also id. art. 8,
18 I.L.M. at 1437.
32. Id. art. 11, 18 I.L.M. at 1438. Article 11 states in paragraph 1 that "[t]he
moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind." Paragraph 3
provides that natural resources "in place" are to be free from appropriation by states
or non-governmental organizations. Paragraph 5 requires parties to the treaty to
establish an international regime to oversee the exploitation of natural resources in
space.
33. There are primarily two distinct positions on the Moon Treaty: that of the
nations possessing space development capabilities, and that of the developing na-
tions who do not possess space development technology. See infra notes 45-55 and
accompanying text.
A major problem arises if each nation would file an "understanding" of its inter-
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Significantly, the Moon Treaty could enter into force even
if the two major space powers, the United States and the Soviet
Union, did not sign it. 34 The Moon Treaty officially entered
into force on July 11, 1984, thirty days after the requisite five
nations submitted their ratifications to the Secretary-General
of the United Nations. 35  The two major space powers, the
United States and the Soviet Union, still have not signed the
agreement. 36 This is mainly due to both nations' concern over
two controversial provisions of the Treaty, namely the com-
mon heritage of mankind principle and the international re-
gime proposed by the Treaty that would oversee space devel-
opment operations. 7
1. The Common Heritage of Mankind Principle
The Moon Treaty provides that "[t]he moon and its natu-
ral resources are the common heritage of mankind. '38  The
common heritage of mankind principle concerns the conserva-
tion of natural resources for present and future generations.3 9
In particular, it seeks the equitable allocation of such re-
sources, concentrating on the needs of the developing na-
tions.40 Originally, the common heritage of mankind principle
applied only to earth resources. In recent years, however, the
developing nations have sought to extend the concept to space
pretation upon signing the treaty; a nation would not be bound by any interpretation
of the Moon Treaty contrary to its own. "There is a risk, however, that all states
might ratify the Treaty with their own understandings. In that event, the general
agreement and its negotiated history would lose all meaning-it would be as if no
Treaty existed at all." Comment, The International Law of Outer Space and its Effect on
Commercial Space Activity, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 521, 552 (1984).
34. See Moon Treaty, supra note 1, art. 19, 18 I.L.M. at 1441. The only require-
ment to put the treaty into effect was the ratification of five nations. Although the
Space Treaty required the ratification of only five nations before its implementation,
three of those five nations had to be the United States, the Soviet Union, and Great
Britain. Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. XIV, para. 1-2, 18 U.S.T. at 2419, T.I.A.S.
No. 6347 at 10, 610 U.N.T.S. at 211.
35. Christol, The Moon Treaty Enters Into Force, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 163 (1985).
36. Id.
37. See infra notes 38-62 and accompanying text.
38. Moon Treaty, supra note 1, art. 11, para. 1, 18 I.L.M. at 1438.
39. Christol, The Common Heritage of Mankind Provision in the 1979 Agreement Gov-
erning the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 14 INT'L LAw. 429, 452
(1980).
40. Id.
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resources. 4 1 The Space Treaty does provide that the moon be
free of any territorial claims .42 The Moon Treaty goes further,
however, stating not only that the surface or subsurface of the
moon be free of property claims by states or private parties,43
but also providing for the nonappropriation of all "natural re-
sources in place."
44
Interpretation of the common heritage language in the
Moon Treaty is crucial to the fate of future space development.
The developing nations, which do not possess space technol-
ogy, argue that the principle should be interpreted as it has
been in the Law of the Sea Treaty.45 The Law of the Sea
Treaty concentrates on the needs of the developing nations,
especially those which produce the minerals which may be
found on the seabed.46 In order to ensure that developing na-
tions received an equitable share of the benefits of sea ex-
ploitation, the General Assembly voted for a moratorium upon
all sea mining operations until an international regime could
be established to regulate the operations.47 A major concern
of the developing nations is that in certain cases their eco-
nomic strength rests upon their ability to export a certain min-
eral.48 If such minerals are suddenly available from another
source, such as the moon, their international bargaining power
would diminish along with their economic strength. A further
concern of the developing nations is the transfer of the tech-
nologies developed through space activities.49 Many break-
throughs in space technology are of practical importance to in-
41. Id. at 453.
42. Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. II, 18 U.S.T. at 2413, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 at 4,
610 U.N.T.S. at 208. "Outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies, is
not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or
occupation, or by any other means." Id.
43. "Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any part thereof or
natural resources in place, shall become property of any State, international intergov-
ernmental or non-governmental organization, national organization or non-govern-
mental entity or of any natural person." Moon Treaty, supra note 1, art. 11, para. 3,
18 I.L.M. at 1438.
44. Id.
45. Law of the Sea Treaty, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 21 I.L.M. 1245.
46. See Note, Extraterrestrial Law on the Final Frontier. A Regime to Govern the Develop-
ment of Celestial Body Resources, 71 GEO. L.J. 1427, 1438-47 (1973); see also SENATE RE-
PORT, supra note 2, at 306.
47. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 299.
48. See generally Note, supra note 46, at 1438-47.
49. See id. at 1438-39.
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dustries on earth and the developing nations would wish to
share these benefits. The developing nations understandably
argue that if the identical language is contained in both the
Law of the Sea Treaty and the Moon Treaty, they should be
interpreted in the same manner.5 °
The Soviet Union and the United States both oppose the
developing nations' interpretation of the common heritage of
mankind principle. The Soviet Union has argued that nonap-
propriation of resources does not mean a complete ban upon
the use of space resources. 5' Furthermore, the Soviet Union
argues that the term "common heritage of mankind" lacks a
historical legal definition and therefore would be impossible to
enforce.52 However, while the, Soviet Union has taken the view
that space should be open to international use, it has not sup-
ported the idea that space should be open to unlimited com-
mercial use.5 3 The United States, on the other hand, has
placed special emphasis upon the "natural resources in place"
language of the Moon Treaty concerning nonappropriation.
The United States asserts that once the natural resource is re-
moved from the moon it becomes subject to appropriation,
whether by a state or private body carrying out the operation. 55
The common heritage principle remains a key determinant in
the future of the Moon Treaty. It appears that if the space
powers are not guaranteed a substantial share of the benefits
of their space operations, they will not sign the treaty.
2. The Proposed International Regime
The Moon Treaty further provides for an international re-
gime to be established once the exploitation of space resources
becomes a reality. 56 This regime would consist of an interna-
tional body which would oversee the development and man-
50. See Dula, Free Enterprise and the Moon Treaty, 2 Hous. INT' L.J. 3, 8-9 (1979).
51. The Soviet Union argues "that nonappropriation does not preclude the use
of natural resources found in space, they draw an analogy with the compatibility of
nonappropriation of the high seas with the freedom to use its resources." Jaksetic,
The Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Soviet Views, 28 AM. U.L. REV. 483, 503 (1979).
52. Id. at 504.
53. See id. at 505.
54. Christol, supra note 39, at 461-62.
55. See id.
56. Moon Treaty, supra note 1, art. 11, para. 5, 18 I.L.M. at 1438.
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agement of the natural resources of the moon. The regime
would regulate operations directed toward the recovery of nat-
ural resources 58 from space and address the concerns of the
developing nations when determining the distribution of the
benefits of these operations. 59 The proposed regime, like the
common heritage of mankind principle, has alienated the
United States and the Soviet Union, further distancing them
from signing the Moon Treaty. Nations capable of space oper-
ations fear that the regime may be organized on a one nation,
one vote scheme. 60  Both the United States and the Soviet
Union oppose any regime that would be controlled by the nu-
merically superior developing nations which do not possess
space technology. 6' The potential inequities of the proposed
regime would have to be eliminated before either nation would
sign the Treaty.62
Nevertheless, the Moon Treaty addresses important
problems facing the future development of space resources,
and its proposals should not be lightly discarded. It is likely,
moreover, that once the United States and the Soviet Union
actually engage in space resource recovery operations, they
will need to look to some document for guidance, and that gui-
dance can be found in the Moon Treaty.
57.The main purposes of the international regime to be established shall
include:
(a) The orderly and safe development of the natural resources of the
moon;
(b) The rational management of those resources;
(c) The expansion of opportunities in the use of those resources;
(d) An equitable sharing by all States Parties in the benefits derived
from those resources, whereby the interests and needs of the developing
countries, as well as the efforts of those countries which have contributed
either directly or indirectly to the exploration of the moon, shall be given
special consideration.
Id. art. 11, para. 7, 18 I.L.M. at 1438.
58. Id. art. 11, para. 7(a).
59. Id. art. 11, para. 7(d).
60. See Note, supra note 46, at 1451-52.
61. See id.; see also SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 333.
62. "It has been pointed out that these stated purposes are so vague as to make
them fertile ground for the imposition of Third World controls, limitations, extrac-
tions of taxation, demands for technology transfer, and special rights or privileges
because they are developing countries." SENATE REPORT, supra note 2 at 338.
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II. UNITED STATES POLICY ON SPACE DEVELOPMENT
The United States has yet to decide whether or not to sign
the Moon Treaty.63 The leading cause of concern within the
private sector is the effect the Moon Treaty will have upon pri-
vate enterprise in space.64 Despite its hesitation in joining an
international scheme of space development, the United States
has acted consistently and decisively in formulating its domes-
tic policy.65 The United States has wholeheartedly placed its
support behind the private development of space, first through
government licensing, 66 then through presidential initiative,67
and most recently through congressional legislation.6
A. Government Licensing Of Private Space Operators
In 1982, the United States government received the first
request by a private company for clearance to launch a com-
mercial space vehicle.69 The government, however, had no bu-
reaucratic mechanism in place to deal with such a request.70
63. See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
64. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 465. See generally Comment, Americans and
the Moon Treaty, 46J. AIR L. & COM. 729, 749-59 (1981).
65. The United States space effort has traditionally been solely the province of
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) which was created under
the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2451-84. The launch
of the first Soviet sputnik gave Congress the impetus to expedite the United States
space program. NASA was created in order to centralize and formulate the United
States space effort in hopes of surpassing the Soviet space effort. 1958 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3160, 3161-65. However, as technology improved relatively
small companies became capable of their own space operations in sharp contrast to
the all encompassing government efforts of the past. See generally S. REP. No. 656,
98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5328, 5334
[hereinafter S. REP. No. 656].
66. See infra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
67. See infra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
68. See infra notes 82-101 and accompanying text.
69. The request was made by a Texas corporation, Space Services Incorporated
of America (SSI), and involved a demonstration model of its Conestoga I rocket
which is intended to be a cost effective launch system for carrying payloads into
earth's orbit. Steptoe, United States Government Licensing of Commercial Space Activities by
Private Enterprise, PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-SEVENTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE 191, 192 (1984).
70. It quickly became apparent that several federal agencies either directly or
indirectly held jurisdiction over various aspects of the launch request. For example,
licenses were necessary from the Federal Communications Commission to gain ac-
cess to government radio frequencies, the Federal Aviation Administration for clear-
ance through controlled air space, and even a license from the Bureau of Alcohol,
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Through an innovative interpretation of existing legislation,7'
the government determined that a rocket and its fuel could be
considered munitions, and the launching of such items out of
the earth's atmosphere could be considered an export of muni-
tions from the United States. 72 Therefore, the launch clear-
ance request was placed under the administration of the State
Department through the authority of the Arms Export Control
Act.73 However, this attempted solution proved to be awkward
and time consuming.74 The companies requesting clearance
were faced with a multitude of administrative procedures that
caused undue expense and delay.
B. Executive Order No. 12465
In the 1984 State of the Union Address, President Reagan
predicted that space was the next natural area of expansion for
the United States private sector. 75 To further this objective,
the President signed Executive Order No. 12465.76 This order
granted the private sector the right to operate expendable
launch vehicles.77 The Department of Transportation (DOT)
was designated the lead agency in the process of granting
launch clearance. 78 DOT was ordered to streamline the pro-
cess of obtaining the various licenses necessary for the space
launch.79 Although DOT became the centralized source of in-
formation for the fledgling private space industry, it could do
Tobacco, and Firearms of the Treasury Department for the conveyance of munitions.
Id. at 193.
71. Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1982). See also International
Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 121-30.
72. Steptoe, supra note 69, at 193.
73. Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1982).
74. See Steptoe, supra note 69, at 193.
75. 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRESS Doc. 61,Jan. 25, 1984 reprinted in I Gorove, United
States Space Law, Release 85-1 (July 1985) I.A.4 at 17. "Just as the oceans opened
up a new world for clipper ships and Yankee traders, space holds enormous potential
for commerce today .... Companies interested in putting payloads in space must
have ready access to private sector launch services." Id.
76. Exec. Order No. 12465, 49 Fed. Reg. 7211 (1984) [hereinafter Exec. Order].
The signing of an executive order is a clear indication of an administration's policy
on a subject. However, executive orders do not need congressional approval and
therefore may be enforced, or not, as the current administration sees fit.
77. An expendable launch vehicle is a non-reusable launch system capable of
placing a payload into standard orbit around the earth. Id.
78. Exec. Order, supra note 76, § 1.
79. Id. § 2.
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little more than determine which agencies the applicants
should contact for licenses. It was still necessary to gain clear-
ance from a multitude of agencies. 80
The Executive Order clearly demonstrates the strong
commitment of the Reagan Administration to private commer-
cial exploitation of space. However, such commitment may
waver with a change in administrations, and executive orders
do not give the stability required to encourage long-term pri-
vate investment in space exploitation. Thus, not long after Ex-
ecutive Order No. 12465 was signed, Congress heeded the pri-
vate sector's call for federal legislation.8'
C. The Commercial Space Launch Act
On October 30, 1984, President Reagan signed the Com-
mercial Space Launch Act into law.82 The Act was intended by
Congress to create a favorable climate for investment in space
operations." The expectation was that the congressional ac-
tion would solidify the United States' position on private space
development in the eyes of the United States' private sector.84
Under the Launch Act, the Secretary of Transportation
would oversee the newly-created Office of Commercial Space
Transportation (OCST).8' The function of the OCST is to
"encourage, facilitate, and promote commercial space
launches by the private sector."'86 The Transportation Secre-
tary is empowered to grant a launch license to any United
States citizen 7 who satisfies OCST's requirements which in-
80. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
81. S. REP. No. 656, supra note 65, at 5328.
82. Launch Act, supra note 5.
83. S. Rep. No. 656, supra note 65, at 5329.
84. The expectation was that a "congressional mandate, via legislation, would
eliminate or reduce the possibility of any arbitrary redirection, restructuring, or
abandonment of initiative." Id.
85. The OCTS was created to implement Executive Order No. 12465, see supra
note 76.
86. Launch Act, supra note 5, § 2604(a)(1).
87. Under the Launch Act a United States citizen is defined as:
(A) any individual who is a citizen of the United States;
(B) ahy corporation, partnership, joint venture, association, or other
entity organized or existing under the laws of the United States or any State;
and
(C) any corporation, partnership, joint venture, association, or other
entity which is organized or exists under the laws of a foreign nation, if the
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clude two separate procedures. The Mission Review assesses
the national security and foreign policy implications of the pro-
posed launch.8 8 This includes the purpose of the launch, the
nature of the payload and whether the launch would endanger
the territory of the United States or of any other nation.8 0 The
Safety Review deals specifically with the nature of the appli-
cant's equipment and launch facilities." One factor is the de-
termination of whether or not the applicant has obtained the
necessary expertise to conduct the launch.9 '
In enacting the Launch Act, Congress made clear that it
was committed to aiding the private sector in space develop-
ment. 2 A major step in this regard is the effort to eliminate
administrative delays from the licensing procedure. Congress
intended that DOT pare down the paperwork and administra-
tive delays normally associated with the licensing process.93 An
applicant must now file directly with the OCST information
concerning the features of the launch site, the proposed launch
vehicle and the nature of the mission.9 4
The OCST is empowered to investigate all such license
requests on its own initiative.9 5 The applicant may at any time
request an administrative review from the department of any
decision made by the Director of OCST concerning the appli-
cation or any change in the license status.9 6 Furthermore, such
administrative rulings may be subject to judicial review.97
Congress recognized that the Launch Act would affect a
very small number of firms that are capable of conducting their
controlling interest (as defined by the Secretary in regulations) in such en-
tity is held by an individual or entity described in subparagraph (A) or (B).
Id. § 2603(l1).
88. 1985 OCTS ANN. REP. at 29.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 30.
92. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
93. Congress intends "DOT to streamline and facilitate the process of comply-
ing with the applicable federal regulations for commercial launch and launch opera-
tions licenses ... [and] expects a reduction in paperwork requirements related to this
activity." S. REP. No. 656, supra note 65, at 5333.
94. Office of Commercial Space Transportation, 51 Fed. Reg. 6876, 6882 (1986)
(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 415.17).
95. See Launch Act, supra note 5, § 2613.
96. 51 Fed. Reg. 6879 (1986) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. §§ 406.1-406.3).
97. Launch Act, supra note 5, § 2611(b).
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own space operations.9 8 Few companies possess the expertise
to produce their own launch sites and vehicles. 9 To remedy
this situation, the Launch Act empowers the Transportation
Secretary to transfer existing government equipment and
launch facilities to the private sector, through sale, lease, or
other means as the Transportation Secretary sees fit.' 00
The transfer of excess government equipment to the pri-
vate sector indicates that the United States government no
longer considers the United States space effort as solely its
own.' 0 ' The United States has established a policy of private
space development, a policy which it has no intention of sacri-
ficing in order to sign the Moon Treaty.
III. EFFECT OF THE MOON TREATY ON EXISTING
UNITED STATES POLICY
The United States policy of private space development
would not be sacrificed if the United States signed the Moon
Treaty. The Moon Treaty is complementary, not contradic-
tory, to the Launch Act. Both documents provide for a stable
environment for the peaceful development of space. The
Moon Treaty's provision for the establishment of an interna-
tional system of space development 0 2 can only benefit the
United States policy of private space development. The inter-
national framework would further stabilize space operations,
which in turn would be conducive to space operations by the
private sector of the United States.
A. Continued Right To Private Development of Space
Critics of the Moon Treaty within the United States per-
ceive two basic obstacles posed by the Moon Treaty that would
be detrimental to the continued private development of space.
The critics contend that the Moon Treaty would deny private
98. S. REP. No. 656, supra note 65, at 5333.
99. See id.
100. Launch Act, supra note 5, § 2614(a).
101. In addition, the Launch Act requires that the private operator acquire its
own liability insurance to cover any potential damage its launch might cause. Cur-
rently, Space Shuttle payloads are insured to the maximum amount available, 500
million U.S. dollars. However, risk analysis techniques are being developed to deter-
mine the exact amounts required. 50 Fed. Reg. 19281 (1985).
102. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
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parties both the right to operate in space and the right of pri-
vate property.'0 3 The critics also argue that any international
regime established under the Moon Treaty would be hostile to
the nations currently capable of space operations as well as to
the private sector of the United States. 04 If either of these
arguments were true, it would bar the private sector from op-
erating in space.'15 Upon close examination, however, both of
these arguments prove to be illusory.
1. Private Sector Operations in Space
There is significant authority in current space law that pri-
vate organizations may operate legally in space. The Moon
Treaty is intended to expand upon, not supersede, principles
of existing space law. 10 6 The Space Treaty clearly provides for
the operation in space of private entities by stating that nations
party to the Space Treaty are responsible to the international
community for any activities in space, whether those activities
are conducted by the government or by a "non-governmental
entity."'' 0 7 The Space Treaty also recognizes that "non-gov-
103. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 455-56.
104. Commentators argue that the international regime would be hostile to na-
tions currently possessing space technology and the United States private sector for
the following reasons:
1. No entity would be permitted to use the Moon's resources in a commer-
cial operation without obtaining authorization from an international organi-
zation whose policies and decisions would be made by a U.N. General As-
sembly-type body.
2. To obtain that authorization, the entity would have to agree to submit a
large share of any profits it makes to the international organization and to
transfer to other countries on a subsidized basis any technology it uses.
3. Authorization would probably be withheld if the entity was from a coun-
try that was already exploiting Moon resources.
4. Ultimately, no national entity would be permitted to exploit the Moon's
resources; instead, an international monopoly would be created.
Dula, supra note 50, at 20-21.
105. The private sector would either be barred legally from operating in space,
or by making such operations unprofitable, it would be impractical for it to do so. See
Note, supra note 46, at 1445.
106. See Moon Treaty, supra note 1, preamble, 18 I.L.M. at 1434.
107. Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. VI, 18 U.S.T. at 2415, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 at
6, 610 U.N.T.S. at 209. The Rescue Treaty provides for the return of astronauts or
equipment to their country of origin regardless of whether they were part of a gov-
ernment controlled operation. See Rescue Treaty, supra note 8, art. 5, 19 U.S.T. at
7574-75, T.I.A.S. No. 6599 at 4-5, 672 U.N.T.S. at 122-23. Also, the Liability Treaty
provides that a nation party to the treaty will be liable for any damage caused by a
space object launched under a nation's flag, regardless of whether it was a govern-
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ernmental entities" may operate in space because it requires
that nations both authorize and provide for "continuing super-
vision"'' 1 8 of such activities.
The Launch Act could be interpreted as providing the
"continuing supervision" of "non-governmental entities" re-
quired by these treaties. The Launch Act does provide that
legislation be implemented by the Transportation Secretary
"consistent with any obligation assumed by the United States
in any treaty, convention, or agreement" to which the United
States is a party."0 9 The Moon Treaty allows private exploita-
tion of space. Therefore, if the sponsoring state is willing to
accept reponsibility for such activities, then the Launch Act,
which creates a framework for governmental control of private
space ventures, is clearly consistent with the Moon Treaty.
Moreover, the Space Treaty provides that a sponsoring
state retain jurisdiction over any person or object launched
into space with the party state's authorization. t0 Any object
launched into space by the private sector of the United States
would remain within the jurisdiction of the United States."'I
The Launch Act provides for the private ownership and opera-
tion of space vehicles. 1 2 Since such objects would remain
within the jurisdiction of the United States, the private owner-
ship rights of the private sector would be recognized by United
States law.
2. The Proposed International Regime
The international regime proposed by the Moon Treaty
has yet to be established, and its nature and structure are still
the subject of debate. Any determination that the regime is
detrimental to private space development would be premature
mental or non-governmental launch. See Liability Treaty, supra note 14, art. 1, para.
(c)(l), 24 U.S.T. at 2392.
108. Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. VI, 18 U.S.T. at 2415, T.I.A.S. No. 6347 at
6, 610 U.N.T.S. at 209.
109. Launch Act, supra note 5, § 2620(d). "The Secretary shall carry out this
chapter consistent with obligations assumed by the United States in any treaty, con-
vention, or agreement that may be in force between the United States and any for-
eign nation."
110. Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. VIII, 18 U.S.T. at 2416, T.I.A.S. No. 6347
at 7, 610 U.N.T.S. at 209.
111. See id.
112. See generally Launch Act, supra note 5.
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at this point in time. However, there are strong arguments to
be made that the regime could be constructed in a manner sat-
isfactory to all nations regardless of their current space capa-
bilities.
The Moon Treaty provides that the regime administer the
"equitable sharing"'1 13 of the benefits derived from the devel-
opment of space resources. It is noteworthy that the phrase
used is "equitable sharing," ' 14 and not "equal sharing." The
word "equitable" implies that a return shall be received in pro-
portion to the investment a party places into an operation." 15
A company undertaking a commercially profitable space opera-
tion could expect, then, to receive a major part of the profits
realized.
The basic point of contention in the structuring of the re-
gime is the delegation of power between those nations pos-
sessing space capabilities and those that do not. 116 The na-
tions capable of space operations, particularly the United
States and the Soviet Union, fear that any regime granting
every nation party to the Treaty an equal vote would mean that
the space-capable nations would be out voted by the numeri-
cally superior nations without space capabilities on every is-
sue. 1" This would be of particular concern to the private sec-
tor of the United States since the regime would determine how
the profits of any space venture would be distributed." 8
It is clear that the United States and the Soviet Union
would not agree to any such situation. A compromise will have
to be reached. A possible solution might be that an impartial
panel be selected to run the regime. 19 However, such an idea
is unrealistic. At some point in the selection process a vote
would still be needed and the same difficulty would be present.
A more realistic answer may be to adopt the compromise made
in the United Nations Charter, that is, a regime structured on
113. Moon Treaty, supra note 1, art. 11, para. 7(d), 18 I.L.M. at 1438.
114. Id.; see supra note 57 (text of para. 7(d)).
115. "Equitable" is defined as "just" as opposed to "equal" which is defined as
uniform or "alike." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 481-82 (5th ed. 1979).
116. Dula, supra note 50, at 19; Note, supra note 46, at 1451; see supra notes 56-62
and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
118. Id.
119. See Note, supra note 46.
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the same lines as the Security Council. 20 The nations that
possess space capabilities would be given permanent seats with
veto power, while the nations without space capabilities would
rotate amongst a group of nonpermanent seats. 2 ' Adhering
to such a regime would not pose a high risk because the Moon
Treaty provides that a nation may withdraw from the Treaty
upon one year's notice. 22 When balanced against the possible
benefits of such a regime, a one-year commitment would ap-
pear to be worthwhile.
B. Benefits Of An International System Of Space Development
Creation of an international regime for the development
of space resources would only help, not hinder the United
States policy of private development of space. An interna-
tional regime would provide the stable political environment
necessary to induce private sector investment.' 23 Any instabil-
ity within the international community concerning the devel-
opment of space resources would be seen as a threat to profits,
adversely affecting the private sector's move towards space in-
vestment. 1 24
In signing the Moon Treaty and taking part in the interna-
tional regime governing the development of space resources,
the United States would receive the protection of international
law and also not be excluded from the benefits of international
space operations. 125 Furthermore, in playing a major role in
the establishment of the international regime, the United
States would maintain its leadership position in space af-
fairs. 1 26 Finally, the international regime would foster cooper-
ation within the international community, especially in
preventing the superpower rivalry between the United States
and Soviet Union from going beyond the environs of the
Earth.
120. U.N. CHARTER art. 23.
121. Id. art. 23, paras. 1-2.
122. Moon Treaty, supra note 1, art. 20, 18 I.L.M. at 1441.
123. See Note, supra note 46, at 1432-33.
124. Id.
125. SENATE REPORT, supra note 2, at 464.
126. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Through the Launch Act of 1984, the United States has
demonstrated its intent to encourage private sector operations
in space. This intent is reconciliable with the Moon Treaty
which also provides for the continued orderly exploration and
exploitation of space.
By signing the Moon Treaty and helping to create an in-
ternational regime to oversee space development, the United
States would maintain its leadership position in space develop-
ment and at the same time protect United States space opera-
tions, both public and private. Only a minimum investment of
one year is required if the United States signs the Moon
Treaty. If at some later date the agreement in fact proves to be
adverse to United States interests, then the United States can
simply withdraw from the agreement.
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